

**SECRET**

Approved For Release 2005/08/03 : CIA-RDP79R00967A001400010019-6

4 March 1970

NOTE TO: Mr. George Carver

SUBJECT: VC Progress in Re-establishing Presence in RVN Areas

25X1

[redacted] rebuilding of the party apparatus  
and the VC presence in the countryside was a priority task --  
essential to support a prolonged military struggle and to be in  
a position to engage in intense struggles in cease-fire type  
political situations. How much progress are the Communists  
actually making in these efforts?

There is a scattering of intelligence on this subject  
which is disquieting -- HEB 70 shows a leveling off of the  
trend line beginning in the fall of 69, the rates of defection  
and rallying are down, and there is lots of evidence that the  
Communists are trying to move cadre back into RVN areas. From  
II Corps in recent weeks have come

25X1

25X1

[redacted] saying that in Binh Dinh and Binh Thuan(?) (or Ninh Thuan)  
it has become progressively easier for VC to enter hamlets and  
villages, particularly at night and to maintain contacts with  
the people. This sounds as if pre-1970 SFR "arrangements" were  
being established in the countryside, and that the people and  
the local RVN authorities had no confidence that the VC would  
not be top dog in the end.

Approved For Release 2005/08/03 : CIA-RDP79R00967A001400010019-6

**SECRET**

Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

**SECRET**

Approved For Release 2005/08/03 : CIA-RDP79R00967A001400010019-6

If this situation is more than a local phenomenon than we and the RVN are of course in deep trouble. In particular, if the RVN is not taking advantage of the current favorable military situation to further weaken the VC apparatus and if in fact, the reverse is taking place in the quiet of the countryside, then some of our basic calculations are all wet. The theory is that pacification and Vietnamization are supposed to put Hanoi under pressure to negotiate because the longer it delays, the weaker the VC political/military base becomes under the continued pressure of pacification. But if the Communists can rebuild their political presence while holding on with a minimum military effort, there is no pressure to negotiate. They can well afford to bide their time and wait for the US to withdraw.

It seems vital that we have more and better insights into:

- (a) What the RVN does, if anything, in reaction to reports such as those cited above from II Corps, and
- (b) the actual situation in the countryside in terms of local attitudes, VC progress in moving cadre back into RVN held areas, and VC success in proselytizing in the RF/PV, ARVN, and RVN administrative apparatus at District level and below.

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/08/03 : CIA-RDP79R00967A001400010019-6

**SECRET**